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Is there one single, critical turning point in American telecommunications history? Put differently, was there one person, event, or institution in the development of the American telecommunications system
that stands head and shoulders above the rest in importance? That question is either very easy to answer or quite difficult. The easy answer is (1)
Alexander Graham Bell, (2) his invention of the telephone, and (3) either
his later creation of the American Bell Company, the forerunner to and
one time parent company of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., or
the dissolution of AT&T in 1984 into a long distance company (AT&T)
and seven local exchange companies (the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) or Baby Bells). That answer is easy because Bell, the
telephone, and AT&T clearly serve as the “but for” cause of the current
telecom system in this country. It is like selecting (1) Abner Doubleday,
(2) bats, balls, and an infield diamond, and (3) nine-person teams as the
“but for” cause of baseball.
But if we leave Bell, his phone, and his company to one side, the
question becomes far more difficult to answer with a high degree of confidence. Indeed, one could reasonably argue that any attempt to identify a
single, critical turning point in the history of American telecommunications is doomed to fail. One need not be a devoté of Chaos Theory to believe that even minor variations in the historical background to—let
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1. The Communications Act of 1934, 42 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1934).
2. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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alone the subsequent technological and human influences on—a dynamic system like telecommunications can produce an exponential increase in the variety of pathways that the system would follow. Which
event was the most important: The development of long-distance amplification technology? Automatic switching devices? Microwave transmission? Computers? Cellular telephony? Fiber optic cable? A good
argument can be made for each one.
Answering the question who was the most important person in telecommunications history is no easier. How about Theodore N. Vail, who
twice held senior positions in the Bell Telephone Company and largely is
responsible for Bell’s pursuit of what became the interconnected nationwide telephone network run by AT&T? Gardiner Greene Hubbard, a Boston lawyer and close friend of Alexander Graham Bell’s, who was one of
the early promoters of telephone service and who hired Vail? The Bell
Labs scientists who invented the transistor, John Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley? Federal District Court Judge Harold
Greene, who oversaw the lawsuit that broke the Bell Operating Companies (the “Baby Bells”) off from AT&T? Perhaps, William Baxter, the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice
Department, who negotiated the settlement of that case with AT&T?
What about Craig McCaw or Sam Ginn, two of the pioneers in wireless
communications?
And what about the most important institution in telecom history?
Was it the Supreme Court, which refused to adopt a general rule requiring interconnection of common carriers, thereby allowing AT&T to stand
alone in local and long-distance service? The Supreme Court also required that the costs of operating local and long-distance service be apportioned between each component of the system by state and local
regulators, which led to the cross-subsidization problems that bedeviled
telecommunications throughout the twentieth century. Was it Congress,
which enacted the Communications Act of 1934,1 creating the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), and then stood on the sidelines as
the FCC and state regulators sought to deal with AT&T? Congress also
later passed the Telecommunications Act of 19962 in order to address the
problems created by the break-up of AT&T. Or was it Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI), the upstart company whose entry into long-distance telecommunications helped to start a chain of events that
ultimately led to the dissolution of AT&T?
Those inquiries truly have as much in common with asking the question, “Who was America’s greatest baseball player?” (Babe Ruth? Ted
Williams? Willie Mays? Henry Aaron? Roy Hobbs?) But, just as one
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baseball player does not make up the entire starting lineup, so, too, no
one person or event should be deemed indispensable in American
telecom history. The difficulty in selecting any specific event or person as
being the single most important factor in American telecommunications
today also does not mean that no set of factors can be used to explain
how we arrived at where we are today. For example, it would be reasonable to ask what events and persons accelerated the advance of telecommunications, started telecommunications on an entirely new path, such
as the growth of wireless service, or possessed not only a clear vision of
how today’s telecommunications system should be established, but also
the wherewithal to lead or propel telecommunications in that direction.
And, besides, whoever said that answering an unanswerable question
cannot be fun.
So with that in mind (and with apologies to David Letterman) let me
offer my “Top 10 Important People, Institutions, or Events in Telecommunications History.” These are ten noteworthy persons, inventions, or
events that helped create today’s American telecommunications system.
Most will not be a surprise to anyone, and at the end of the day most
probably can be fit into two categories—technological developments
and the people who managed all or some part of the Bell System—
but each one is worth separate consideration. And Number One is the
single most important person, institution, and event in American
telecommunications.
NUMBER 10
WESTERN UNION’S DECISION NOT TO
PURCHASE BELL’S PATENTS

10/02/2013 12:46:52
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Ironically, the first item in the list is a mistake: Western Union’s
decision not to purchase Bell’s telephone patents.
The nineteenth century saw a fundamental reshaping of traditional
mechanisms for transmitting information due to the development or extension nationwide of four new communications networks: the United
States Postal Service, the Railway Mail Service, Western Union’s telegraph system, and the Bell telephone system. The Western Union telegraph system was by far the most important of the four.
Samuel F.B. Morse sent the first interstate telegraph message on
May 24, 1844, from Washington, D.C., to Baltimore, Maryland: “What
hath God wrought.” Western Union dominated the telegraph business in
the nineteenth century and became the first national communications
company. Innovative as well, Western Union introduced the first stock
ticker in 1866 and money transfer in 1871. The telegraph system
changed American commerce in several fundamental ways. (1) Trade:
The telegraph changed the nature of speculation about crops and crop
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3. A NATION TRANSFORMED BY INFORMATION: HOW INFORMATION HAS SHAPED THE
UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 55, 63, 82-90 (Alfred D. Chandler,
Jr. & James W. Cortada, eds., 2003) [hereinafter A NATION TRANSFORMED].
4. RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM
FRANKLIN TO MORSE 255-56 (1995).
5. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 190, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 4 Side B

prices. Previously, the delay in transmitting information gave farmers
and others close to the source of agricultural information a decided advantage over others. But now the ability to transmit information almost
instantaneously nationwide changed the nature of speculation from retrospective to prospective gambling. That is, the telegraph led to the creation of a futures market for prices of crops not yet harvested or even
planted. In addition, the birth of futures markets led to the creation of
the Chicago Board of Trade to coordinate and regularize those complex
futures transactions. (2) Newspapers: The telegraph led to the creation of
the New York Associated Press, the forerunner to the Associated Press,
as New York City newspapers entered into a joint venture to obtain and
disseminate news quickly. (3) Railroads: The telegraph and the railroad
were “the ‘Siamese twins of commerce’ ” because the telegraph ran along
the railroad rights-of-way, enabling the railroads to use just one track
without innumerable accidents and allowing the telegraph to traverse
the country without needing to obtain separate property rights of passage. (4) Perishable goods: The telegraph helped to support the perishable goods industry.3
Samuel F.B. Morse hoped that the federal government would operate the telegraph as it had with the Postal Service, which Morse saw as
the forerunner of the telegraph. Private merchants thought that only the
federal government could build and evenhandedly operate the telegraph.
Private businesses also feared the monopoly power that could be held if
only one firm operated a telegraph system. Ultimately, however, the government decided in 1847 not to run the telegraph system itself, dashing
Morse’s hopes that the government would control the means of interstate
communication in America. Part of the reason why the government decided not to nationalize and operate the new telegraph system was the
belief held by Andrew Jackson and his supporters that, given the potential power of the telegraph, the federal government should not be responsible for operating this system and expanding the power of the federal
government.4
In 1879, however, before the Sherman Antitrust Act of 18905 became
law, Western Union abandoned the telephone business after losing patent litigation with the Bell System over the telephone. The two companies settled their differences by dividing the interstate communications
business between them. Western Union kept the telegraph line of busi-
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ness, which Bell walked away from, while Bell did the same for telegraphy. Bell offered to sell the telephone patents to Western Union, but the
latter refused the deal. Perhaps, at the time the decision was a reasonable one; telegraphy was then by far the superior power in communications. But history has proved it to be a mistaken judgment. Over the
twentieth century, telephony eclipsed telegraphy in the number of customers served, the number of messages sent, the amount of income generated, and in every other relevant feature of communications. The Bell
Company, later known as the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, or just AT&T, became the world’s preeminent telecommunications
firm and America’s largest corporation.6 Over time, money transfers became Western Union’s primary line of business. Western Union ended its
telegraph communications service on January 27, 2006.7
NUMBER 9
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS IN THE EXPRESS CASES
AND THE SEPARATIONS CASE
Name a contemporary social problem and there’s probably a way
that it could arise in litigation.8 As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, “[t]here
is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner
or later turn into a judicial one.”9 It therefore is not surprising that the
Supreme Court would play an important role in the early shaping of telecommunications policy. In fact, two different Supreme Court decisions
helped to define the telecom playing field in much the same way that the
foul lines lay down the playing field for baseball.
The first United States Supreme Court decision, Memphis & Little
Rock Railroad Company v. Southern Express Company.10 (the Express
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6. “[I]n telecommunications, the Bell System constructed and operated a nationwide
telephone network that was the envy of the world. Standardization, centralized control of
engineering and operations, and cross-subsidized pricing produced high-quality service
that reached nearly all areas of the country. And the earnings were sufficiently generous to
support Bell Laboratories, the world’s preeminent industrial research center.” RICHARD H.
K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 10
(1994).
7. The Western Union website showed this final message: “Effective 2006-01-27,
Western Union will discontinue all Telegram and Commercial Messaging services. We regret any inconvenience this may cause you, and we thank you for your loyal patronage. If
you have any questions or concerns, please contact a customer service representative.”
Ironically, the Western Union legacy has lived on after its demise in the form of “text messaging”—viz., Short Message Service or SMS. TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET:
THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY’S ON-LINE PIONEERS 215-16 (1998).
8. Even global warming. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497
(2007).
9. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer trans., 1966) (1832).
10. Memphis L. R. Co. v. S. Exp. Co., 117 U.S. 1 (1886).
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11. The Court explained that railroads had made investment decisions based on exclusivity, railroads had never held themselves out to other railroads as willing to serve them
on the same basis that a railroad served the public, requiring interconnection might disrupt a railroad’s ability to serve the public, and there was no tradition of railroads serving
as common carriers for each other. See id. at 20-29.
12. Id. at 21.
13. Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
14. The Supreme Court has read the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, as
a broad grant of authority to Congress to regulate virtually any activity that has any remote relationship to interstate commerce for most of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress can regulate a small-scale
activity such as home-grown wheat if the nationwide sum of that activity can affect interstate commerce); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (stating the same result for homegrown cannabis). Recently, the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress’ Commerce
Clause power cannot be expanded indefinitely and has limited Congress’ power in this regard. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding unconstitutional as
exceeding Congress’s commerce power the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.
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Cases), arose in the context of railroad transportation. Like telecommunications, rail transport has been deemed a “common carrier” that must
be available to all parties on nondiscriminatory terms and that is subject
to government regulation as to its rates, routes, and service. The issue in
the Express Cases was whether railroads must serve as common carriers
not only for individuals and shippers, but also for each other. That is,
must each railroad allow every other one to interconnect with its own
facilities (track, switches, roundhouses, etc.) in order to take advantage
of so-called natural monopoly “bottleneck facilities” (as an economist
might say) and to allow customers the opportunity to select different carriers for transit throughout the nation (as a consumer might say)? By
statute, Congress had required telegraph companies to interconnect and
transmit another firm’s traffic, so the argument was made that the same
principle should apply in the case of the iron horse. The Supreme Court,
however, expressly rejected that theory. The Court concluded that, for
several reasons, the common law underpinnings of the common carrier
doctrine did not extend quite that far.11 The Court therefore refused to
order the interconnection of different railroad lines—that is, to make any
one or all such companies “a common carrier of common carriers.”12
The second Supreme Court decision was Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company (the Separations Case).13 The American system of government consists of a complex, confusing mix of federal and state
jurisdiction over most aspects of public policy, including commerce.
States have the authority to regulate commerce by virtue of what is
called their inherent “police power,” while Article I of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to regulate “interstate” commerce. The two
grants of authority overlap, and understanding the difference between
state and federal regulation of commerce occupies most of a first-year
law school course in constitutional law.14 The Separations Case involved
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§ 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed. & Supp. V), which made it a crime to possess a firearm in the
vicinity of a school); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a statute making rape a federal crime). The Court’s latest foray into this issue was
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (which involved the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010)). Five justices concluded that there are limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause,
but there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito concluded that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to
adopt that law, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577-2609 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); Id. at 2642-76
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting), but the five Justices were not all on the
same side of the judgment. By contrast, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan
concluded that the Act was a lawful exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power. Id. at
2609-42 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). How the law will play out in this area remains to be
seen.
15. Smith, 282 U.S. at 146-62.
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the question of how that regulatory authority over telecommunications
was divided between the state and federal governments. One theory—
the “station-to-station” theory—was that a phone call from New York
City to San Francisco should be treated as an indivisible entity that
could be regulated only by the federal government. The competing
“board-to-board” theory broke down a phone call into three components
each of which must be regulated separately: (i) the intrastate New York
element regulated by the Empire State; (ii) the interstate element regulated by the federal government; and (iii) the intrastate California element regulated by the Golden State.
The Supreme Court adopted a regulatory theory that distinguished
intrastate from interstate commerce. In Smith, the Court held that the
capital costs of operating the Bell System had to be allocated between the
local exchange service and the interstate toll service.15 The result was
the system of “separations”—viz., an accounting process that divided the
costs of telecommunications capital into state and interstate components, so that prices could be set accordingly by the regulators involved.
The states could regulate telephone service, but were limited to the intrastate facilities and service. Interstate facilities and service must be
“separated” from its intrastate aspects, and only the federal government
had jurisdiction over those elements of telecommunications.
Together, the decisions of the Express Cases and the Separations
Case defined how the Bell System operated for most of the twentieth century. Gaul may have been divided into three parts, but America’s telephone system had but two – local exchange service and long-distance
service – and AT&T owned both of them. Historically, the Bell System
preferred to allocate all of its costs to local service, which was regulated
under the rate-of-return system, in order to recapture common capital
costs in the ratemaking process. State and local regulators, however,
wanted Bell to allocate some portion of its common capital costs to its
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interstate business, in order to keep local costs low. The result was a
series of accounting measures designed not to reflect the economic reality of AT&T’s cost of providing local and long-distance service,16 but to
serve the political necessity of keeping local exchange rates low for consumers at the expense of other parties and telecommunications services.17 That scheme of cross-subsidization lasted only as long as AT&T
remained the sole provider of long-distance telephone service. Once the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the courts allowed rivals to enter that line of business and engage in “cream skimming” by
underpricing AT&T’s long-distance service, the cross-subsidization system came undone.
NUMBER 8
THE KINGSBURY COMMITMENT OF 1913
AT&T went through several stages, from competition (against Western Union) to monopoly (due to its settlement with Western Union and
its own patents) to competition against rival telephone companies (once
the original patents expired) to, ultimately, regulated monopoly status.
For a while, the Bell System had several antagonists. Independent telephone companies disliked Bell’s monopoly; consumers disliked Bell’s monopoly (read: high) prices and imperial-service attitude; the states
disliked the high prices charged consumers (read: voters); and the federal government saw Bell’s monopoly as socially inefficient.
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16. Marginal-cost pricing is optimal in a competitive industry. By contrast, that pricing approach would not allow a natural monopoly with high fixed costs, such as telecommunications, to recover its fixed costs. Ramsey Pricing is an alternative. Ramsey Pricing
achieves its goals by increasing prices where demand is inelastic and decreasing prices
where demand is elastic. The result is that, contrary to the historic telephone cross-subsidy
pricing scheme, long distance rates would decrease and local exchange rates would increase. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN, ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 765-67 (2d
ed. 2006).
17. The Communications Act of 1934 provided that issues relating to separations
should first be presented to a Joint Board of federal and state commissioners before being
submitted to the FCC for a final decision. The Joint Board adopted its first formal separations manual in 1947. That manual divided telecom plants and facilities into portions subject to federal or state jurisdiction. GERALD BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE
INFORMATION AGE: FROM MONOPOLY TO COMPETITION 66-68 (1994). Over time, several different subsidies gained hold. Business customers subsidized private customers through
higher business telephone rates—viz., different rates for the same service. Urban customers subsidized rural customers because both groups paid the same rate—which meant that
they paid the same rate for different services, different because urban service is subject to
economies of density, which makes the cost of adding a new consumer less than in rural
areas. Interstate customers subsidized local customers through higher long distance phone
rates, resulting from an arbitrary allocation of a greater amount of the fixed cost of providing telephone service to long distance than to local exchange traffic. And so-called “vertical
services”—e.g., caller identification, call waiting, call forwarding, speed dialing—subsidized basic exchange service. BENJAMIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at 763-64.

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 7 Side A

10/02/2013 12:46:52

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-4\SFT401.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 9

TURNING POINTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

2-OCT-13

8:46

521

C M
Y K

10/02/2013 12:46:52

18. Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Telephone Problem and the Road to Telephone Regulation in
the United States, 1876-1917, 3 J. OF POL’Y HIST. 42, 171-73 (1991).
19. Willis-Graham Act, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 221(a)) repealed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56, § 601(b)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
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Over time, however, AT&T ultimately won the contest. AT&T acquired the backing of the J.P. Morgan Company, giving AT&T more financial resources than the independents could bring to bear. AT&T
therefore bought off, or defeated, the independent telephone companies
who gave up their fight against AT&T’s monopoly. Some independents
decided to be acquired by AT&T, rather than compete against it. The
Kingsbury Commitment of 1913 resolved all of AT&T’s other problems.
AT&T pacified state regulators and consumers by agreeing to state regulation of rates and service. AT&T appeased the federal government in
the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913 by agreeing to divest itself of Western Union, not to acquire additional independent telephone companies,
and to interconnect its interstate lines (but not its local exchanges) with
the local lines of willing independent phone companies. The result was
that AT&T became a regulated monopolist, a status that lasted until
1984, when a federal district court broke up AT&T into one long distance
company and the seven Baby Bells.
The Kingsbury Commitment of 1913 proved to be a major success for
AT&T. AT&T prevented the federal government from nationalizing the
telephone industry, as had occurred in some other nations, and also
helped prompt the state and federal governments to adopt favorable regulatory systems. By accepting regulated monopoly status and avoiding
both governmental ownership and antitrust litigation, the Kingsbury
Commitment helped enable the Bell System to achieve its four business
goals: (1) horizontal integration of local exchanges owned by AT&T via
(2) AT&T’s monopoly over interexchange long-distance communications;
(3) backwards vertical integration into equipment manufacturing; and
(4) forward, vertical integration into leasing of retail equipment to consumers, rather than sales. State price regulation was a small price to pay
for monopoly status.18
Ironically, during the Great War the federal government took control of the telecommunications system for national defense purposes and
learned that only the Bell Company had the technical know-how to operate a national telephone system. Accordingly, after the War the government decided that it was desirable to have just one company supply
telecommunications service nationwide. Congress passed the WillisGraham Act of 192119 in order to lift the restriction in the Kingsbury
Commitment on the Bell System’s acquisition of other telephone companies. As a result, the Bell System grew dramatically. By the early 1930s,
Bell had eighty percent of the local exchange customers, ninety percent
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of the local exchange traffic, ninety-two percent of all telephone equipment sales (via Western Electric), and almost one hundred percent of the
long-distance traffic (via the AT&T Long Lines Division).20 AT&T truly
had become America’s telephone company.
NUMBER 7
DEVELOPMENT IN THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL
TREATMENT OF THE REGULATION OF BUSINESS
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20. Cohen, supra note 18, at 173-74.
21. As Supreme Court Justice and professor Stephen Breyer has explained: “The common law is emphatically a regulatory system. It depends on the creation and enforcement,
by law, of a set of rights, notably those creating private property and freedom of contract.”
STEPHEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 4 (6th ed. 2006).
22. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
23. The tort law, some have argued, was very favorable to businesses during this period. The Carroll Towing standard limited the circumstances in which a plaintiff could
recover for injuries caused by his employer to instances of “unreasonable-as-inefficient”
conduct. Atop that, companion doctrines such as assumption of the risk and the fellowservant rule made it even more difficult for an employee to recover against an employer
under traditional tort theories. In sum, although tort law was perhaps the principal vehicle
for regulating business conduct, it is unclear how well tort law performed that task. For a
discussion of those doctrines and the historical and contemporary uses of tort law to regulate business, see, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (9th ed. 2008);
JOHN G. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS (1968); W. KIP VISCUSI, REGULA-
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In the nineteenth century, regulation was done several ways, but
there were two common denominators: reliance on the common law as
the source of rules to be enforced, and use of the courts as enforcers.21 A
common regulatory structure involved application of tort law by the
courts. English and American tort law regulated private, particularly
business, conduct principally by defining a standard for damages liability in negligence. (Contemporary tort liability theories, such as implied
warranty and products liability, were not born until the 1960s.) The general rule was that only “unreasonable” conduct could sustain liability, so
the question in each case was whether the defendant acted reasonably.
The answer was contingent on what a “reasonable man” would have done
under like circumstances, which, in turn, hinged on whether the costs of
further precautions exceeded the discounted cost or expected loss of potential damage. The best-known explanation of the legal standard applicable to most instances of nonintentional torts was the famous Carroll
Towing standard adopted by Judge Learned Hand.22 Under that standard, the defendant was guilty of negligence if the loss it caused, discounted by the likelihood of the accident occurring, exceeded the burden
of the precautions that the defendant could have taken to avert the
accident.23
Another example of the use of the courts as regulatory agencies can
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be seen in the Sherman Act of 1891.24 Once described as the “Magna
Carta” of our free enterprise system,25 the Sherman Act seeks to protect
the public against anticompetitive conduct.26 Federal antitrust law
therefore is a form of economic regulation of markets and businesses.27
The goal of the Sherman Act is to promote consumer welfare and protect
the competitive process by outlawing “unreasonable” restraints of
trade.28
THROUGH LITIGATION (2002); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECHISTORY (1980).
Another approach during the nineteenth century rested on a combination of contract
and corporation law. The contemporary public utility doctrine grew out of the nineteenth
century principle that some state-created corporations, deemed “franchises,” should be
treated different from general state-authorized corporations. The reason was that the former were “affected with a public interest,” since they were natural monopolies. Initially,
corporations were chartered by the state for specific purposes, e.g., to construct a particular
bridge. The state regulated corporations in three ways: by inserting conditions into corporate charters, by repealing such charters, or in litigation through quo warranto actions
brought by the state attorney general. Over time, however, public opposition to the privileged status of early corporations led the states to enact general corporation laws allowing
any qualifying business to assume corporate form. As the consequence, however, control
over a corporation was transferred from the state attorney general to a board of directors
and the shareholders. The board could directly supervise corporate officers, and the shareholders could seek relief in court against corporate officers and the board for a violation of
their fiduciary duties. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 150 (2005); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 30-32, 56-64, 125-26
(1991).
24. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act §§ 1-7.
25. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws . . .
are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of
our fundamental freedoms.”).
26. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1993); Standard Oil Co.
of Ca. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) (“It is the theory of the antitrust laws
that the long-run advantage of the community depends upon the removal of restraints
upon competition.”).
27. See, e.g., BREYER, ET AL., supra note 21, at 7 (“[A]ntitrust is a form of regulation – a
type of market intervention in an economy whose nucleus is private markets”); Fred S.
McChesney, Be True to Your School: Chicago’s Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
323, 328 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds. 1995) (“Antitrust is economic
regulation. Its essence is the regulation of certain types of economic relationships: horizontal agreements to fix prices, agreements between competitors to combine (by merger or
otherwise), and so forth.”) (footnote omitted); e.g., Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915
F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1990).
28. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) (“It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.”); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, 858 F.2d 792, 794 (1st
Cir. 1988); Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly: The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57
AMER. ECON. REV. 242, 244 (1967); HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 23,
at 1; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001).
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29. Broadly speaking, contemporary regulation can broadly be placed into two categories. Economic regulation involves the control of entry, exit, rates, and other business or
financial conduct of firms in a given market. Social regulation involves the control of economic externalities or activities that imperil human life, health, or the environment. During the first half of the twentieth century, the public supported economic regulation and
opposed social regulation, while the opposite was generally true for the second half of the
twentieth century. The difference perhaps was due to a fear of big business, the occurrence
of the Great Depression prior to WWII and the tremendous post-WWII economic growth
and rise of concern with quality of life factors. Clifford Winston & Robert W. Crandall,
Explaining Regulatory Policy, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS 8-17 (1994).
30. RICHARD J. PIERCE & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 18 (1999).
31. Id. at 14-18.
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The New Deal signaled a change in how regulation would be performed. Regulation now would be conducted by administrative agencies.
Why? One reason for this change was the dramatic evolution in the post
Civil War economy from a series of local markets to a national market.
The result was that the states were incapable of regulating this new
market both as a matter of law (due to limitations imposed on states by
the Dormant Commerce Clause) and as a matter of practicality (due to a
state’s inability to enforce state law dictates beyond its borders). Another
factor was the belief that standing agencies were better equipped to undertake a regulatory task than courts. Judges are generalists; they ordinarily are not specialists in any particular field. Judges cannot
proactively reach out to address social problems; they must await the
filing of a lawsuit. And judges cannot issue broad-based regulations to
address large-scale social problems; they can only issue a judgment in a
particular case involving specific parties.29
The debate changed dramatically in the 1970s. Economists, members of Congress, and even some members of regulatory agencies came to
believe that economic regulation often was sclerotic and harmed consumers by protecting incumbents against competition. The market was seen
as a better forum for advancing economic welfare than the halls of the
regulatory agencies. Congress began to experiment with deregulation in
several important markets, e.g., air transport, trucking, railroads, and
financial services. “Deregulation of those markets produced dramatic, socially beneficial results. In each case, consumers are now saving many
billions of dollars per year as a result of deregulation.”30 In the 1980s
and 1990s, advocates for regulatory reform turned their attention to the
“network industries”—natural gas, electricity, and telecommunications—with the same goal of increasing the role of unregulated competition and decreasing the role of regulated monopoly in providing goods
and services.31
Telecommunications regulation was originally justified on neoclassical grounds as necessary to prevent price gouging by a natural monopoly.
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Neoclassical microeconomics taught that if the demand for a product
within a relevant market can be satisfied at the lowest cost by one firm
rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever
the actual number of firms in it.32 But over time the natural monopoly
theory became less and less persuasive. The reason was twofold: (1) technological developments, particularly in wireless communication, showed
that competition could exist in communications without the unduly expensive build-out necessary for traditional, wireline Plain Old Telephone
Service (known as POTS); and (2) as the ability for rivalry in telecommunications came to be a reality, the justification for treating AT&T as an
indivisible, monolithic entity melted away.
The telecom industry has not been entirely deregulated although
wireless telecommunications has gone a long way in that direction. Indeed, some federal legislation that passed in the 1990s has increased elements of regulation of wireline telecommunications, as discussed below.
But insofar as regulation is governed by the laws of politics, rather than
the principles of economics, the extent of telecom regulation always will
remain a subject for debate and will vary over time.
NUMBER 6
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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32. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANI104 (4th ed. 2005); W. KIP VISCUSI, ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 535 (4th ed. 2005); CHRISTOPHER STERLING ET AL., SHAPING AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 93-95 (2006).
33. The U.S. Postal Service’s organization provided the blueprint for the layout of the
wireline telecommunications system. For a discussion of the Postal Service, see A NATION
TRANSFORMED, supra note 3, at 91-99; JOHN, supra note 4.
ZATION
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This subject is one that military pilots would call a “target-rich environment,” so only a few need be mentioned. For example, Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876, and the telephone switchboard
came about two years later. The switchboard allowed for a far more efficient telecommunications network because it permitted use of a huband-spokes network, just like the one that the United States Postal Service had implemented beginning in the John Adams Administration.33
In 1913, the Bell Company acquired patents for its long-distance
amplification technology, the audion. The audion was the first vacuum
tube electronic amplifier, which gave Bell a major lead over competing
telephone systems in long-distance service, to which every independent
local exchange company needed interconnection. The result was that
more people could be networked with far fewer lines. Similarly, the laying of the transatlantic cable connecting the United States and Great
Britain in 1858, the first of numerous such cables, helped bind people
and commerce together internationally.
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The “French Telephone,” available in this country in 1927, combined
a transmitter and receiver in one handset. Later, the Hush-a-Phone, a
harmless mouthpiece attached to a phone to provide privacy, and the
Carterphone, a device connecting a radio to the landline system for use
by utilities’ field maintenance workers, forced AT&T to allow devices not
manufactured by its wholly-owned subsidiary Western Electric to be connected to the phone system. The result proved that manufacturing exclusivity was not essential for the system to function well.
Switches changed from human operators to electromechanical systems to crossbar systems to digital systems and PBXs. Long distance
technology went from copper wire to coaxial cable and multiplexing to
microwaves to geostationary satellites to optical fiber. Open-wire line
system (above-ground, pole-to-pole connections) and coaxial cable (belowground, larger-capacity wires) were the only transmission vehicles until
after World War II, when microwave transmission came on stream. Developed for private commercial use after WWII, microwave transmission
allowed a large quantity of information to be transmitted inexpensively
over a long distance.34
The transistor, invented by AT&T’s Bell Labs, allowed the development of the modern-day cell phone. The computer aided telecommunications in various ways.35 The creation of broadband communication to
transmit data has enabled the nearly instantaneous transmission of
commercial data, particularly in the financial sector.36 And the Internet,
an offshoot of the ARPANET developed by the federal government for
military and scientific purposes, threatens, along with wireless communications, to displace the historic wireline services provided by AT&T
and its offspring.
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34. VISCUSI, supra note 32, at 535.
35. The computer industry also has seen subdevelopments, as well. There are four
components to a computer system: (1) hardware, such as processing, storage, and terminals, plus associated peripherals such as printers, scanners, and bulk storage devices
(mainframes are manufactured IBM, Hitachi, Unisys, and Fujitsu; workstation are manufactured by Sun-Microsystems, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Compaq/Digital, and Silicon Graphics; PCs are manufactured by Compaq, Dell, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Gateway); (2)
software, such as operating systems (manufactured by Microsoft, Mac OS, Unix, Linux, and
OS/2 warp) and application programs, such as word processing, spreadsheet, and database
programs, as well as specialized enterprise resource planning software (manufactured by
SAP, Oracle, PeopleSoft, J.D. Edwards, and Baan); (3) network equipment, such as switches
and routers used to connect individual computers (manufactured by Cisco Systems, 3Com,
Northern Telecom/Bay Networks, and Cabletron Systems); and (4) consulting, systems integration, and data processing services (performed by EDS, Anderson Consulting, Computer
Sciences, GE Capital ITS, and Science Applications). THOMAS J. HOUSEL & ERIC W.
SKOPEC, GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION 46-47 (2001).
36. Broadband is a connection capable of 200 kilobits a second both upstream and
downstream. Robert W. Crandall et al., The Benefits of Broadband and the Effects of Regulation, in BROADBAND 295 n.2 (Robert W. Crandall & James H. Alleman eds., 2002).
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Technological innovations such as wireless communications undercut the economies of scale on which the natural monopoly theory of
telecom regulation always had rested, as well as the cross-subsidies that
had resulted from the separations regime.37 Those developments occurred simultaneously with the first of two major restructurings of the
domestic telecommunications industry, the next relevant Top 10 item.
NUMBER 5
THE ANTITRUST CASES AGAINST AT&T
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37. VIETOR, supra note 6, at 188-90.
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No American company is a stranger to litigation (this is America,
where everyone believes in a right to sue anyone else for anything), and
no large American firm is a stranger to antitrust litigation. AT&T was no
exception.
As noted above, early in the twentieth century AT&T’s size generated concern among the public, the states, and the federal government.
At the time, only the federal government could bring a suit under the
Sherman Act against a firm (states and private parties now can do so,
too), and the Justice Department filed one, challenging AT&T’s refusal to
interconnect with other smaller telecommunications companies. AT&T
and the government settled that lawsuit in the famous Kingsbury Commitment of 1913 noted above, a settlement that left AT&T in its (near)
monopoly position in local exchange and interstate communications.
The federal government tried again late in the 1940s and early in
the 1950s with a second antitrust suit. (At the request of the Defense
Department, the lawsuit was put on hold for the Korean War.) This time
the focus was on AT&T’s ownership of Western Electric, the exclusive
manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. The government’s theory was that, by demanding that only Western Electric’s products be
used in connection with AT&T’s phone service, AT&T had monopolized
the business of manufacturing phone equipment. But here, again, the
government settled the case rather than take it to trial. The Defense Department came to AT&T’s aid, arguing that any breakup of AT&T would
create a risk of a disruption of telecommunications service deemed essential to the safety of the nation during the Cold War. The settlement permitted AT&T to keep Western Electric as a wholly owned subsidiary,
required AT&T to license its patents to other firms, and prohibited
AT&T from entering the computer industry. The first two elements of
the settlement were designed to satisfy the Defense and Justice Departments. The third element sought to please state regulators, by preventing AT&T from undercutting competition in the computer industry by
cross-subsidizing that business via rate increases in its regulated tele-
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communications services. Interestingly, this last element of the settlement ultimately induced AT&T later to agree to the dissolution of its
monolithic status.38
AT&T made that decision in the third antitrust suit relevant here,
United States v. AT&T.39 This time, the federal government challenged
as violating the Sherman Act not only AT&T’s refusal to interconnect
with other telecom firms—including new entrants into the long distance
field, such as MCI and Sprint—but also the other actions that AT&T
took to maintain its monopolies in local exchange and long-distance traffic, such as its attempt to compete with MCI by offering a less expensive
long-distance service. For a third time, the case settled in lieu of a trial,
but this time the case settled on the government’s terms. The reasons
were that the trial judge signaled that he would rule in the government’s
favor, AT&T feared more what remedies the judge would impose than
the ones sought by the Justice Department, and AT&T wanted to enter
the computer industry, which it could do only if the earlier antitrust settlement were modified. The parties therefore came together in 1982 and
entered into an agreement that transformed the American telecom system by breaking up AT&T into separate local exchanges and a long-distance business.40 The trial court approved the settlement agreement
and also modified the 1954 antitrust settlement in what became known
as the Modification of Final Judgment, or MFJ.
The divestiture, which went into effect two years later, imposed a
sharp dividing line between what were seen as the competitive long-distance and natural monopoly local exchange segments of the industry. According to that theory, local exchange carriers should be confined to
offering monopoly local exchange service and barred from participating

10/02/2013 12:46:52
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38. See BROCK, supra note 17, at 240:
The FCC’s decision to allow the integrated provision of enhanced services with
local exchange service originated in the difficulties of determining the dividing line
between those classes of service and in fears of limiting technological advance. The
increasing integration of computer technology into all phases of communication
during the 1980s made any distinction between computer and communications
service appear artificial. Telephone companies routinely provided information services integrated into their ordinary operations through directory services, credit
call validation, and 800 service. There was no clear distinction between that type
of information service (classified as basic because they were aspects of providing
traditional telephone service) and newer services such as voice storage that were
classified as enhanced because they provided nontraditional services to the
consumers.
39. United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978), 524 F. Supp. 1336
(D.D.C. 1981), 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983). There also were a variety of private antitrust suits against AT&T, but none of
them had the same effect as the federal government’s lawsuit.
40. For a detailed discussion of the lawsuit and settlement that lead to the break-up of
AT&T, see PETER TEMIN & LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN
PRICES AND POLITICS (1989).
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in competitive long-distance, manufacturing, or information services.
Participants in the competitive markets should be unregulated, generally unaffiliated with the local exchange carriers, and should purchase
needed local services from the local exchange carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis, with prices for those monopolized inputs controlled by
regulation.41
NUMBER 4
MICROWAVE TRANSMISSION, MOTOROLA, AND MCI
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41. BROCK, supra note 17, at 217. AT&T was still subjected to price regulation after the
1984 breakup, because government officials feared that deregulation would lead to either of
two (conflicting) outcomes: Fear (1) – a price increase, because rivals could not offer the
same services or quality of services as AT&T, or Fear (2) – a price decrease below predatory
levels, as AT&T attempted to drive rivals from the field. Some believe that both fears were
proved wrong. Fear (1) was proved wrong because the demand for telecom services was
price-sensitive, and the development of fiber optic cables greatly increased the available
supply of telecom transmission. Fear (2) was proved wrong because AT&T could not have
engaged in the type of self-ruinous price cutting necessary to drive MCI from the market.
VISCUSI, supra note 32, at 540-43, 548-49.
42. VISCUSI, supra note 32, at 535.
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With a novel business plan, a little bit of money, and a boatload of
grit and determination, Microwave Communications, Inc. (“MCI”) proved
to the telecom world that David still could beat Goliath.
Motorola was instrumental in the development and early promotion
of microwave point-to-point communication, which it helped to invent
while working for the War Department during World War II. Both openwire line system connections (above-ground, pole-to-pole) and coaxial
cable (below-ground, larger-capacity wires) had large fixed costs, so
AT&T was a natural monopoly in that regard. But the same was not true
with respect to microwave transmission. Developed for private commercial use after the war, microwave transmission allowed a large quantity
of information to be transmitted inexpensively over a long distance. After
the war, Motorola urged the FCC to permit greater and greater use of
microwave transmission, but the FCC then was unwilling to unseat
AT&T as the monopoly provider of long-distance telecommunication services. Microwave transmission was used principally by utilities and allied firms, such as oil and gas pipelines.42
But in the 1960s, MCI came up with a new idea. MCI proposed offering companies the ability to communicate internally between Chicago,
Illinois and St. Louis, Missouri by subscribing to its system, rather than
by purchasing a private line from AT&T for the same purpose. AT&T
vigorously opposed MCI’s proposal. AT&T argued that allowing a rival to
operate only an interstate phone service would enable it to “skim the
cream” from the telecom business by underpricing the artificially high
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prices that the FCC and state regulators had forced AT&T to charge for
interstate service in order to subsidize lower-priced local exchange service. Nonetheless, after years of skirmishing in the FCC and the federal
appellate courts, MCI ultimately was able to offer its Chicago-St. Louis
service—which it immediately sought to expand by linking together
other cities, as well as by interconnecting with AT&T’s local exchange
services. MCI was successful yet again in those efforts, ultimately becoming one of the major challengers to AT&T’s dominance of the longdistance telecommunications market.
MCI’s importance lies not in its ability to compete away customers
from AT&T; the latter remained the dominant long-distance carrier long
after MCI entered that line of work. No, MCI’s importance in telecom
history was in forcing the government, in the form of the FCC and the
federal courts, to re-examine the unstated legal underpinnings of the
telecom monopoly that the government had bestowed on AT&T via the
Kingsbury Commitment, the Communications Act of 1934, the 1954 antitrust settlement, and the years of deeming AT&T the sole provider of
American telecommunication services. It was that re-examination which
persuaded the political and legal communities that the American
telecom system could survive, even prosper, without one firm being in
charge of the entire end-to-end process.
NUMBER 3
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S TWO PRINCIPAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAWS: THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF 1934 AND THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
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43. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
44. VIETOR, supra note 6, at 176.
45. The primary common carrier provisions were the following: (1) Common carriers
were obliged to serve all who request service; (2) the FCC had the right to require interconnection when it deemed it necessary; (3) telephone rates had to be just and reasonable; (4)
unreasonable discrimination was prohibited; (5) publicly available tariffs for communica-
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The Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 are the two most important pieces of telecommunications regulation enacted by Congress in the twentieth century. Congress passed the
Communications Act of 193443 early in FDR’s Administration as one of
many examples of what was the then prevailing theory of regulation.
The Communications Act of 1934 was not controversial. Written by the
Administration, the act became law after little debate. The consensus
was that the Bell Company should remain a privately owned and operated regulated monopoly.44 The common carrier provisions of the 1934
Act were based on analogous provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act
that had been written for the railroads.45 The 1934 Act was Congress’
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tions charges had to be filed and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner; (6) the FCC could
suspend tariffs for up to five months to investigate and hold a hearing regarding their
lawfulness; (7) the FCC had the power to prescribe tariffs after a hearing; (8) the FCC had
the authority to investigate complaints and, after a hearing, award damages, instead of
bringing an action in court; (9) existing facilities could be extended only after the FCC
issued a certificate of “present or future public convenience and necessity” justified the
extension; (10) the FCC was given the authority to prescribe the accounting system and
depreciation schedule for carriers; (11) the FCC was given extensive authority to compel
information from carriers; (12) the act created a seven- member commission (later reduced
to five members) who held office for seven years and who could be removed only for cause.
BROCK, supra note 17, at 51-52.
46. Pub. L. No. 104 § 601(b)(2), 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151
(2006)).
47. BENJAMIN, supra note 16, at 772.
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attempt to regulate AT&T’s monopoly POTS service by entrusting its
care to the FCC.
By contrast, the Telecommunications Act of 199646 was a response
to changing technologies and market conditions that rendered obsolete
the natural monopoly and cross-subsidy features of the telecom industry.
The 1996 Act had several major components. First: The Act sought to
increase competition in the local exchange market by lifting all stateimposed barriers to entry. Second: The Act required the “Baby Bells”
split off from AT&T pursuant to the 1984 MFJ, known as Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs), to interconnect for local service with
the new rivals, known as Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs).
Third: The Act allowed CLECs to rent various separate elements of an
ILEC’s business (e.g., its local exchange trunks, switches, etc.), on a
piece-by-piece basis, a practice known as purchasing Unbundled Network Elements, or the entire system altogether, a practice known as
purchasing Unbundled Network Elements—Platform or UNE-P. Compensation was to be paid according to a formula to be determined by the
FCC. Fourth: The Act sought to increase competition in the long distance
market by allowing ILECs to compete for long-distance service, thereby
lifting the ban on such entry imposed by the 1984 MFJ, once the ILECs
could prove to the FCC’s satisfaction that there was adequate competition in their regions for local exchange service.47
The interconnection and intercarrier compensation features of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 together proved to be quite controversial. A major reason was the formula that the FCC adopted for intercarrier compensation, the Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost
(TELRIC) formula. TELRIC was a forward-looking cost methodology
used to price an ILEC’s separate, unbundled network elements (UNE).
The problem was that Congress prohibited the FCC from using an
ILEC’s historical costs as its pricing methodology, even though historybased pricing had been the prevailing methodology throughout the twen-
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tieth century.48 Instead, the elements of the TELRIC pricing formula
were (1) the marginal cost of servicing a CLEC; (2) a proportion of depreciation for facilities equipment; (3) a proportionate share of overhead;
and (4) some share of the cost of capital invested in the element.49
Congress’ decision put the FCC in a bind. On the one hand, if the
FCC allowed an ILEC to recover its fixed costs, then the FCC would have
violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which prohibited using
historical costs. The network elements would have been underused, because marginal cost-pricing is the most efficient pricing mechanism.
And, CLECs would have built their own facilities even if there already
was an adequate amount of facilities equipment available. But on the
other hand, if the FCC did not allow an ILEC to recover its historical
costs, then the ILEC would suffer a loss of fixed cost. The ILEC would be
deterred from spending money on research and development, because
those expenditures could not be recaptured. Even CLECs might be deterred from spending money on construction or research and development, for fear that they eventually would be treated as ILECs.50
Accordingly, the FCC’s UNE-P and TELRIC rules were vocally criticized
by the ILECs on the ground that they created a disincentive to CLECs to
create their own facilities and to ILECs to invest in new ones, and, by
creating such disincentives, thereby hurt the public.51
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48. Id. at 779-80. Historical costs would not necessarily yield higher prices than forward-looking costs; it depended on the inputs and the amount of depreciation for existing
facilities. For that reason, some BOCs proposed a forward-looking (replacement) methodology, but with more realistic assumptions than TELRIC’s. Moreover, components of the
TELRIC inquiry did require a calculation of (forward-looking) fixed costs and permitted
ILECs to recover a pro rata share of those fixed costs from CLECs to the extent the CLECs
used an ILEC’s capacity. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL
CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE App. A, at 43153 (2007).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., George Bittlingmayer & Thomas W. Hazlet, The Financial Effects of
Broadband Regulation, in BROADBAND, supra note 36, at 245, 252-54 (describing UNE-P
and TELRIC as “the tragedy of the commons”); Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and
Regulation in Broadband Communications, in BROADBAND, supra note 36, at 157, 177-85;
Jerry Hausman, Internet-Related Services: The Results of Asymmetric Regulation, in
BROADBAND, supra note 36, at 129, 136-39, 148-49, 151; Charles L. Jackson, Wired HighSpeed Access, in BROADBAND, supra note 36, at 83, 100-01; Robert W. Crandall & Martin
W. Hazlett, Telecommunications Policy Reform in the U.S. and Canada, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALIZATION ON TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC 8, 22-23 (Martin Cave & Robert W.
Crandall eds., 2001).
For a discussion of how the UNE-P and TELRIC pricing rules undermined the benefits
of and the “deal” that was a part of price cap regulation, see DALE E. LEHMAN & DENNIS
WEISMAN, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: THE “COSTS” OF MANAGED COMPETITION
85-99 (2000). For example, the UNE-P and TELRIC rules have a “margin spread” effect on
an incumbent due to the “output effect” and “input effect.” The output effect occurs when a
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That controversy (and some others) died down over the ensuing decade. The Supreme Court upheld use of the TELRIC formula,52 but that
Court and the federal circuit courts struck down other aspects of the
FCC’s post-1996 Telecom Act rules, such as ones relating to legacy elements of the telephone network (e.g., capacity on circuit switches and the
high-frequency portion of the copper loop).53 Moreover, the post-1996
Act growth in wireless communication, the use of fiber optic lines for
voice, data, and video services, the acquisition of AT&T and MCI by
ILECs (SBC, immediately renamed as AT&T, and Verizon Communications Inc., respectively) and the explosion in Internet communication –
all those factors worked to dampen the effect of the FCC’s post-Act rules
on the ILECs. It is unclear what, if anything Congress will do to address
the current, dramatically-changed telecom landscape.
NUMBER 2
WIRELESS COMMUNICATION AND ITS USE IN
CELLULAR TECHNOLOGY
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CLEC is allowed to price one service, such as long distance service, below what an ILEC is
forced to charge as a means of keeping low the cost of other services, such as local service.
(That is what occurred to AT&T from the FCC’s decision to allow MCI to enter only the long
distance market and to price long distance calls below the price that AT&T could charge.)
The input effect occurs when an ILEC is forced to sell its services to a CLEC at a rate below
its costs by using TELRIC forward-looking pricing, rather than historical rates and costs.
52. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
53. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
54. As the Economist magazine has noted, “When you leave your house, you probably
take your keys, your wallet and your phone.” A Spiritual Connection, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10,
2005. According to one study, two-thirds of all U.S. households have at least one cellphone,
with many having more than one. CNET News.com Staff, More Cell Phones, Less Satisfaction, CNET NEWS.COM (Apr. 13, 2005, 12:55 PM) (citing a Forrester Research study)) http://
news.cnet.com/More-cell-phones%2C-less-satisfaction/21000-1039_3-5669525.html.
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Guglielmo Marconi won the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1909 for his
contributions to wireless telegraphy, an invention with even greater potential for long-distance communication than the telegraph or telephone,
because wireless devices allow communications between points that are
impossible or impracticable to connect physically. At one time principally
used by civilian vessels for ship-to-shore or inter-ship voice traffic or by
the military for battlefield communications, wireless communication devices – e.g., cell phones, BlackBerries, iPhones, and the like – have reshaped the telecommunications market in ways unrecognizable to Ma
Bell. Wireless phones now are an established, mass-market consumer
device.54
It is difficult to overstate the impact of wireless communications on
today’s telecom world. Wireless technology has freed individuals from
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landline phones and trunks, has obliterated the once-rigid boundaries
between local exchange and long-distance services, and has made data
and video services available to nearly everyone everywhere in the United
States and the world.55 Wireless technology also has led to a revolution
in communications pricing. The 1997 introduction by AT&T of a per
month bundle of minutes billed at one price transformed telecommunications pricing, which historically had been defined in geographic terms
(local vs. long distance traffic). Telecommunications companies also offer
a discount if a consumer “bundles” his wireless, wireline, Internet, and
television services into one package. Moreover, we are witnessing, particularly among young and new cell phone users, a permanent transition
away from wireline phones exclusively to wireless devices.56 Indeed,
some economists have estimated that a shift of only ten percent from
wireline to wireless communications in America creates a sufficient
amount of intermodal competition to justify deregulation of wireline
communications altogether.57 In other nations, wireless communication
devices have enable governments – such as the new government of Iraq –
to leap-frog over the build-out of extensive (and expensive) wireline communications trunks and give people their first opportunity for intra- and
international communications by constructing cell towers, instead.
The growth in wireless communication and the Internet are the two
most recent and dramatic telecommunications developments since the
enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Their effect is such
that, in 2006, The Economist predicted that within five years telecom
companies would offer wireline service as a free add-on whenever a customer purchased wireless, broadband, or fiber optic video service. That
day has not yet arrived, but the prospect that Ma Bell’s old landlines
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57. Jerry Hausman, in BROADBAND, supra note 36, at 106, 125.
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55. For a discussion of the development of wireless technology and the growth of the
wireless industry, see LOUIS GALAMBOS, ANYTIME, ANYWHERE: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE
CREATION OF A WIRELESS WORLD (2002); Jerry Hausman, in BROADBAND, supra note 36, at
106, 117-18.
56. A 2004 survey done for the Centers for Disease Control found that 5.5% of adults
lived in households with only wireless phones in the second half of 2004, up from 4.4% in
the first half of 2004 and 2.8% in the first half of 2003. Stephen Blumberg, Household
Telephone Service and Usage Patterns in the US in 2004, Presented at U.S. Household
Telephone Usage Patterns in 2004: A Focus on Cell Phone Usage, (June 16, 2005). The rate
among younger users appears much higher, with roughly 14% of 18-24 year-olds living in
wireless-only households. According to one analyst, most wireless-only users do not actually cancel their wireline service; instead, they simply never sign up for wireline when
making an initial phone service decision. Jason Armstrong, et al., Americas: Telecom Wireless, GOLDMAN SACHS, EQUITY RESEARCH 1 (2005). One researcher has estimated that, by
the end of 2004, there were more wireless subscribers (184 million) than wireline subscribers (176 million) in the United States. Timothy Horan, et al., Transfer of Coverage: We
Favor Wireless and Cable Over Wireline, CIBC World Markets, EQUITY RESEARCH 2 (2005).
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would disappear from use as consumers switch to Dick Tracey’s two-way
“wrist radios” is no longer just a comic book dream.
NUMBER 1
A TIE – THEODORE VAIL AND THE INTERNET
There is a tie for the Number 1 spot between Theodore Vail and the
Internet. Vail wins the award for starting telecommunications on the
path that it followed for most of the twentieth century, while the Internet takes the baton possibly to newer heights than even Vail could
have imagined.
A. THEODORE VAIL

C M
Y K

BENJAMIN, supra note 16, at 698.
Richard R. John, Theodore N. Vail and the Civic Origins of Universal Service, 28
ECON. HIST. 71 (1999).
Id. at 71-74.
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Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone, but Theodore Vail
created the Bell System and the concept of “universal service” – “One
Policy, One System, Universal Service.” By “universal service” Vail
meant, not what is meant by that term today—namely, the principle
that everyone has the right to inexpensive telephone service—but that
only one telephone company—the Bell Company—would supply telephone service in the United States.58
Richard John discusses the different theories regarding the development of the concept of universal service: viz., the belief that telephone
use ought to be available to all Americans across one nationwide system.59 John explains that historians have offered several explanations
for the origins of universal service in America: (1) AT&T’s universal service was “attributable to a unique combination of technological virtuosity
and visionary leadership;” (2) “a key turning point was the acquisition
[by AT&T] of Western Electric in 1881 – an event that set the stage for
Bell’s preeminence in industrial research;” (3) establishment of close relations between the operating companies and the AT&T long-lines division; (4) “skillful entrepreneurship,” “an ‘almost irrational’ commitment
to interconnection,” and “the active cooperation of state regulatory bodies;” (5) the daring, imaginative work of entrepreneurs who, after the
expiration of Bell’s patents, established telephone systems in regions not
served by Bell Telephone; and (6) the use by ordinary Americans of the
telephone as a means of connecting America not just politically and economically, but socially.60
John has a different view. In his opinion, the civic rationale for nationwide development of the U.S. Postal Service also underlays the
growth of the telephone network. According to John, Gardiner Greene
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Hubbard, a confidant of Alexander Graham Bell and an early promoter
of the telephone, saw that the telegraph failed to realize the democratic
potential of the Postal Service and sought to put the Bell system on a
trajectory to accomplish what the telegraph had failed to do: viz., expand
beyond its core business purposes and customers to reach all of the
American public. Theodore Vail, whom Hubbard hired away from the
Postal Service (where he was General Superintendent of the Railway
Mail Service) to work at Bell Telephone, modeled the telephone network
on the Postal Service network. Vail saw universal service, not as a means
of stifling competition, but as a means of creating a national communications system.61 In John’s words:
[T]he nation’s telephone network evolved from the basic information infrastructure of the Industrial Age – from the U.S. Postal System, its
U.S. Railway Mail Service, and Western Union. The creative entrepreneur most responsible for this evolution was Theodore Newton Vail. His
story vividly illustrates how technologies, people, and organizations –
and their collective learning and experiences – evolved consecutively
over time, how the technological infrastructures and resulting organizational system (and those involved creating these infrastructures and
the resulting systems) became the building blocks of the emerging Information Age. From Vail to today, a clear line of events suggests the
nature of continuity at work.62

Id. at 74-79.
A NATION TRANSFORMED, supra note 3, at 283.
Id. at 91-99.
Id. at 284-85.
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Vail undertook a series of specific actions to implement his “universal service” vision. Vail won every patent case brought by or against the
Bell Company, and he midwifed the Bell Telephone–Western Union settlement. He helped to achieve the enhanced capitalization of the Bell
Company by securing the backing of J.P. Morgan. Vail oversaw Bell’s
1881 acquisition of Western Electric, then a leading manufacturer of
electrical equipment, associated with Western Union for a decade, and
which ultimately gave birth to Bell Labs, perhaps America’s greatest corporate R&D arm. A strong supporter of expanding Bell’s interstate network and heavily influenced by the network operation of the Postal
System,63 Vail was in charge when the Bell Company entered into the
Kingsbury Commitment with the federal government and thereafter
built out its telephone network. In his second tour at the Bell Company,
Vail became the first head of AT&T, which began as the long-distance
subsidiary of Bell Telephone, but eventually became the parent company. AT&T became the nation’s second largest corporation, ahead of the
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and behind only the United States
Steel Corporation, which AT&T later overtook.64
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Why and how did Vail adopt this strategy? Vail foresaw the rise of
competition once Bell’s patents had expired and sought to maintain
AT&T’s dominant position by strengthening the Bell Company’s technological and business positions in the telecommunications industry. Vail’s
strategy had three components. First: Vail sought to enhance the reach
and dominance of Bell’s local and long distance telephone service by encouraging technological innovation and refusing to interconnect with
other phone companies, thereby encouraging them to sell out to Bell. Second: Vail sought to establish Western Electric as the dominant telephone
equipment manufacturer, thereby effectively forcing every telephone
company not snatched up by Bell to purchase its equipment from Western Electric. Third: Vail sought to develop and introduce new technologies by the internal development of new equipment in what later became
Bell Labs, by stressing the need for standardization of telecommunications equipment, thereby effectively creating a national standard that
only Bell equipment could satisfy, and by the introduction of new technology on a carefully phased-in, system-wide basis.65

In sum, Vail took a successful telephone company, changed it into
the world’s preeminent telephone company by overcoming or acquiring
his rivals, and, through a few wisely adopted and craftily-structured
compromises, defeated every legal and political effort by all branches of
the federal and state governments to disassemble or limit his creation. In
making AT&T into an iconic American company, Vail certainly ranks
with Henry Ford as one of the giants of twentieth century American
business.
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65. Louis Galambos, Theodore N. Vail and the Role of Innovation in the Modern Bell
System, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 95, 101-26 (1992).
66. Id., at 102-04. The vision that Vail had and the steps that he took to implement
“universal service” established the framework within later actions fit. A NATION TRANSFORMED, supra note 3, at 285-86.
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Vail successfully defeated the political attempts to weaken Bell’s
hold over telecommunications. To pacify state officials, Vail agreed to
state regulation of price, profits, and service. To satisfy federal officials,
Vail entered into the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment, in which he agreed
to divest Bell of Western Union, which it had acquired, to cease acquiring
new independent telephone companies, and to offer long-distance service
to any other telephone company that wanted to interconnect with the
Bell system. That last element of the Kingsbury Commitment, although
a change from the prior Bell policy of refusing to allow interconnection,
worked to Bell’s advantage, Vail surmised, because it let smaller, independent companies develop the less densely populated, less affluent rural areas of America while still connecting with them as part of Vail’s
notion of “universal service.”66
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B. THE INTERNET
The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers, “smart phones,” and the like that can communicate with each
other across the globe. The Internet began as the “ARPANET,” a telecommunications program created by the Advanced Research Projects
Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense to ensure that the military
and its supervising civilians could communicate in the event that a war
destroyed ordinarily-used communications facilities and transmission
lines. The ARPANET no longer exists, but it served as the model for the
Internet, which links millions of people worldwide to communicate with
one another, to access vast amounts of stored information, and to
purchase goods directly from the manufacturer.67

CONCLUSION
I promised you the top ten persons, inventions, or events in the history of telecommunications, and I delivered eleven. So sue me.
Whatever the number, the list is a diverse and, in my opinion, comprehensive set of the most important factors that have led to today’s modern, worldwide telecom industry.
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67. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997). For an excellent discussion of
the importance of the Internet, and of the history, policy, and law of telecommunications
generally, see NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 48.
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The Internet has been a truly revolutionary development. At a
plebian level, the Internet enables consumers to shop for goods nationwide and buy directly from the manufacturer as a means of lowering the
cost of purchasing an item. At a more patrician level, the Internet enables everyone to become an online author and publisher of articles,
books, photographs, music, movies, or anything else that can be reduced
to ones and zeros. And at a realpolitik level, the Internet enables disparate groups to communicate with each other in peacetime, to foment insurrection, or to plan military moves in a rebellion like the one that we
witnessed occur in Libya in 2011. Add in the ability to access the Internet through handheld devices like a smart phone and you have the
ability to manage (much of) life from anywhere and while on the go. Paying the rent, watching a movie, or playing Sudoku while sitting on the
subway may not advance civilization very far, but the other, always-increasing uses of the Internet likely will have just that effect. Think of
the telegraph or telephone on steroids, and you have the Internet. Yet,
because no one owns it, there is no cost for people to use it—except what
you pay your carrier to access it.

